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A marketing-finance approach linking contracts in agricultural 






A  conceptual  marketing-finance  framework  is  proposed  which  links  channel  contracting  in 
agriculture  and  the  use  of  financial  facilitating  services  (e.g.,  financial  derivatives)  to 
(shareholder)  value  creation.  The  framework  complements  existing  literature  by  explicitly 
including channel contract relationships as market-based assets that can be managed to reduce 
cash flow volatility and hence increase shareholder value. We show how financial facilitating 
services (e.g., derivatives) can be used to complement the cash flows components of channel 
contract relationships thereby further reducing the risk adjusted cost of capital and improving 
shareholder value. In a field study of producers, wholesalers, and processors, in the potato and 
meat industry the framework shows how shareholder value can be enhanced by using financial 
facilitating  services,  such  as  derivatives,  to  complement  marketing  channel  relationships. 
Moreover, this study shows how producers and managers from agribusiness companies can use 
such  financial  services  as  conflict-solving  tools  in  case  of  incongruent  contract  preferences 
between channel members.  
 




1.  Introduction 
 
There is a rising and converging interest in agricultural economics as to how marketing activities 
relate to value creation (Srinivasan and Hanssens, 2009). Financial facilitating services, such as 
commodity  futures,    may  be  the  link  to  establishing  such  a  causal  chain.  Recognizing  the 
important role that financial facilitating services can play in managing cash flow volatility, this 
paper develops a conceptual framework of risk and interdependence that shows how managerial 
focus on shareholder value relates to concrete behavior, such as the use of cash versus forward 
contracts  to  maintain  relationships  with  channel  members,  even  under  asymmetric  power 
conditions. 
In  so  doing,  this  paper  addresses  the  following  research  questions:  How  do  financial 
derivatives interact with marketing management decisions? How is marketing management’s use 
of  financial  derivatives  related  to  an  organizational  focus  on  shareholder  value?  How  can 
marketing activities, with the help of financial derivatives, reduce the risk adjusted cost of capital 
(and hence enhance shareholder value)? How can derivatives complement marketing channel 
contract behavior so that more optimal cash flow patterns can be achieved? How can derivatives 
solve channel conflicts caused by incongruent contract preferences amongst channel members? 
  The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  First  hypotheses  are  developed 
concerning how the framework can be used to decrease cash flow volatility (and hence decrease 
in the risk adjusted cost of capital) and resolve channel conflicts. After that, an empirical study  
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involving a unique combination of accounting data and interviews with producers, wholesalers 
and  processors  is  presented  to  illustrate  the  validity  of  the  framework.  In  the  managerial 
implications,  the  findings  from  this  study  are  used  to  address  a  key  question  that  has  been 
repeatedly raised in interviews with industrial managers: How can a focus on shareholder value 




2.  A Conceptual Marketing-Finance Framework of Channel Contracts 
 
In Figure 1, we present our conceptual framework which links channel contracting to shareholder 
value. It explicitly shows how the internal and external environment of a marketing manager 
relates to their contract preferences and, specifically, their use of financial facilitating services 
and how marketing may use financial facilitating services in channel contract relationships to 
directly reduce cash flow volatility and increase shareholder value. The conceptual framework 
demonstrates the complementing role that financial facilitating services can play in resolving 
channel conflict caused by incongruity in channel members’ contract preferences. The different 
components of the conceptual framework are discussed in detail, starting with the relationship 
between shareholder value and (different types of) financial contracts. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
2.1.  How Shareholder Value Relates to Contracting 
 
Shareholder value can be conceptualized as a forecasted cash flow, which is discounted by the 
risk-adjusted cost of capital (Leland, 1998).
2 Rappaport (1986) shows that shareholder value can 
be enhanced in four different ways: (1) by accelerating cash flows, (2) by increasing the level of 
cash  flows,  (3)  by  enhancing  the  residual  value  of  cash  flows,  and  (4)  by  reducing  the 
vulnerability and volatility of cash flows. In this paper, we focus exclusively on cash flow 
volatility. A decrease in cash flow volatility cuts the firm’s cost of capital, therewith enhancing 
its shareholder value. That is, more stable cash flows generate higher net present values, hence 
creating less systematic risk and, in turn, more shareholder value.  
To date, no study in agricultural economics empirically examines how marketing managers 
can  use  contracting  behavior  and  derivatives  to  manage  cash  flow  volatility  and  enhance 
shareholder value. In line with this thinking on cash flow consequences, there are two broad 
classes of contracts of most interest for this study: cash contracts and forward contracts.  
 
2.2.  Cash versus Forward Contracts 
A  cash  contract  (also  referred  to  as  a  spot  transaction)  defines  the  price  at  the  time  of  the 
transaction (time t+1), and is based on the spot market, instead of the time when the contract is 
initiated (time  t). This  contract  is  an agreement between two parties to  exchange a good or 
service immediately at a particular price. Examples include the sales of used cars, cattle, or items 
 
2 The risk-adjusted cost of capital is t he risk-free-rate plus a risk premium that is based on an analysis of the risk 
characteristics of the cash flow stream (e.g., cash flow volatility).  
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in Wal-Mart. Cash flows resulting from such contracts are uncertain at the moment of initiating 
the contract (time t).  
In contrast to cash contracts, forward contracts fix the price at the time of initiation (time t). 
As a result, the cash flow generated at the time of actual delivery is certain (time t+1). Thus, 
forward contracts reduce the volatility of cash flows between companies and, as a consequence, 
enhance shareholder value. Indeed, in practice managers have been shown to dislike cash flow 
volatility  (Graham  et  al.,  2005)  and  the  benefits  of  reducing  cash  flow  volatility  are  well 
understood in the financial literature.  
 
 
3. Hypotheses  
 
To investigate the framework presented in Figure 1, we focus on the contract preferences of 
marketing  managers  by  making  a  distinction  between  the  relevant  internal  and  external 
environment to the manager. A firm’s shareholders form the relevant external environment to 
managers, while the internal environment is reflected by the risk attitudes and risk perceptions of 
a firm’s manager.
3 Both external and internal environments have been associated with contract 
preferences (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1987), and Figure 1 illustrates their conceptual relationship.  
 
3.1.  Contract Relationship Preferences 
             
Since marketing managers can use cash or forward contracts as tools to manage shareholder 
value, their individual preferences should be influenced by their focus on shareholder value. We 
expect managers in firms with a high focus on shareholder value to generally prefer forward 
contract  relationships  over  cash  contract  relationships.  This  is  because  forward  contract 
relationships reduce the firm’s cash flow volatility, hence enhancing shareholder value.  
 
H1:   Marketing  managers  with  a  high  focus  on  shareholder  value  prefer 
forward contract relationships over cash contract relationships.  
 
Along  with  the  external  environment,  the  internal  environment  also  influences  a  marketing 
manager’s contract preference. Two important drivers of contract preferences are risk attitudes 
and risk perceptions (Pennings and Smidts, 2000). Pennings and Smidts (2000) empirically show 
the important role of risk attitude and risk perception in the formation of contract preferences. In 
their study, risk-averse managers prefer forward contracts over cash contracts in situations they 
perceive as risky.  
 
H2:  Risk aversion and risk perception are positively related to the marketing manager’s 
preference for a forward contract relationship over a cash contract relationship. 
 
3.2.  Preferred Contacts versus Realized (Actual) Contracts 
 
 
3 The managers’ risk attitudes are composed of their own intrinsic risk attitude and risk-taking incentives (e.g., 
compensation structure) (Pennings and Wansink, 2004).  
4 
 
Whether a marketing manager’s preferred contract relationship will also be the realized (actual) 
contract  relationship  depends  on  the  other  manager’s  (partner  company)  contract  preference. 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 40), “interdependence exists whenever one actor does 
not  entirely  control  all  of  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  achievement  of  an  action  or  for 
obtaining  the  outcome  desired  from  the  action.”  Contract  disagreement  between  highly 
interdependent  companies  might  result  in  conflict,  increasing  the  probability  of  relationship 
termination. This becomes even more probable when there is interdependence asymmetry. 
In many contexts, interdependence asymmetry results in a situation in which the stronger (less 
dependent) company forces its contract preference on the weaker (more dependent) company. 
However,  this  use  of  power  may  result  in  a  tense  relationship,  conflict,  and  ultimately 
relationship termination.
4 
Yet, oddly enough, thousands of these relationships thrive. Consider the relationships between 
wholesalers  of  raw  food  products  (such  as  meat  and  produce)  and  their  processors.  The 
marketing channel of raw foods is often characterized by the presence of a large number of 
wholesalers or intermediaries (relatively small operations) and by a small number of processors 
(relatively large operations) (Keith et al., 1990). In a wholesale operation, the manager is usually 
the owner, whereas the large processors are usually publicly held. These structural differences 
might cause differences in focus on shareholder value and make contract relationships difficult to 
establish. Yet, because services are available to com plement the cash flow consequences of a 
contract, even in such situations contract relationships can be established. 
 
3.3.  Resolving Contract Conflict with Financial Facilitating Services 
 
Contracts  between  companies  can  be  complemented  by  services  purchased  by  one  or  both 
companies in order to improve the outcome of the contract. One such service is a quality check of 
the product by a third party, which ensures that the buyer receives the correct product and that the 
seller avoids a breach-of-contract suit.  
  One of the potentially most influential services that can influence shareholder value are the  
financial facilitating services that complement the cash flow consequences of a contract.
5 Upper 
management’s  preferred  cash  flow  outcome  should  be  represented  in  the  combination  of 
contracts  and  the  use  of  financial  facilitating  services  by  marketing  managers.  Financial 
facilitating  services  can  include  price  volatility  reduction  services  provided  by  financial 
institutions such as banks and exchanges. Such services reduce the price volatility inherent in a 
particular contract relationship, and they are frequently used at the centrally-traded London- and 
Chicago-based exchanges, as well as in over-the counter trading by large processors and banks.  
   
3.4.  Conflicting Contract Relationship Preferences: an Example  
 
Suppose Company A is a wholesaler of a food raw material and Company B is a processor of that 
same food raw material. Assume further that the market for this raw material is highly volatile 
and price fluctuations are large and unpredictable. The two companies know each other well and 
 
4  In this context, channel conflict represents the level of tension, frustration, and disagreement in the channel 
relationship (Frazier et al., 1989). 
5 Financial facilitating services include all exchange-traded contracts, and off-exchange contracts; their primary 




know what to expect as seller and buyer. Furthermore, both companies are physically close, so 
delivery is a simple matter for both. In this scenario, it would be valuable for both to build a close 
relationship and exchange the raw material. This relationship might then be formalized by a 
contract that defines when, where, how much, and of what quality the wholesaler will deliver to 
the processor.  
Yet  one  element  would  still  need  further  definition:  the  cash  flow  consequences  of  the 
contract.  Should  a  cash  or  a  forward  contract  relationship  be  established?  Suppose  that  the 
wholesaler prefers a cash contract relationship that enables him or her to adapt to price changes 
of  the  raw  material.  However,  the  processor  may  feel  that  a  cash  contract  would  lead  to 
undesirable cash flow volatility that interferes with generating optimal shareholder value. The 
above situation might lead both companies away from an exchange and the establishment of a 
contract relationship, even though all the other elements of the exchange process (place, time, 
quantity, and quality) are highly favorable to both. 
 
3.5.  Conflicting  Contract  Relationship  Preferences:  Financial  Facilitating  Services  as  a  
Solution 
 
Financial facilitating services can complement the cash flow consequences of the contract. As a 
result, they can make a contract amenable to both companies by solving the dilemma outlined 
above. For example, the processor might use the hedging services offered by one of the Chicago 
exchanges to complement the cash contract relationship preferred by the wholesaler.
6 A hedging 
service is a service through which the processor is offered the opportunity to buy products 
forward at a fixed price, thereby not restricting  the processor to engage in a cash contract 
relationship with the wholesaler.
7 In the raw food industry, hedging services are commonly used 
to  facilitate  contract  relationships  between  companies.  The  major  commodity  exchanges 
accomplish this by organizing markets in which futures contracts are traded.
8 Exchanges make it 
possible for those who want to manage price volatility – “hedgers” – to transfer this price volatility 
(through  the  hedging  service  of  the  exchange) to speculators willing to accept it (through the 
speculation service of the exchange).  
Suppose the previously mentioned processor wants to initiate a cash contract (not a forward 
contract) according to the wholesaler’s contract preferences. At the time the contract is signed (t) 
the processor then uses an exchange’s hedging service to buy the same product in the futures 
market for delivery at t+1 for a price agreed upon at t. The processor’s cash contract with the 
wholesaler, combined with the hedging service, yields a cash flow equal to that of a forward 
contract. Thus, the processor succeeds in fixing the price in advance, without demanding this 
from the wholesaler in their cash contract. Hence, marketing managers may resolve conflicts 
resulting  from  incongruent  contract  preferences  by  using  financial  facilitating  services  that 
complement the cash flow consequences of contracts.  
 
6 Hedging is the practice of offsetting the price volatility inherent in any cash contract relationship (i.e., cash market 
position) by taking an equal but opposite position in the futures market.  Futures contracts are standardized with 
respect to characteristics of the product covered by the contract, time and  place of delivery of the product, and they 
are traded under the rules of an organized exchange. 
7 In general terms, a hedging service can be defined as “a service through which a channel member is offered the 
opportunity to buy or sell products forward at a fixed price, thereby not restricting the channel member to engage in 
a cash contract relationship”. 




H3: Conflict  caused  by  contract  preference  incongruence  increases  the  probability  of 
marketing managers’ use of financial facilitating services.  
 
 
4. An Empirical Study of Contract Relationships 
 
To illustrate the empirical validity of the conceptual framework, we use data from a field study of 
vertically-aligned companies that differ in both their external and internal environments. Since 
the objective of the study is to examine the influence of external environments (the focus on 
shareholder value) and internal environments (managerial risk attitudes and perceptions) on the 
use of financial facilitating services in contracting, we need to investigate industries where both 
financial records of performance and complete records of contracting behavior are available.  
One context which fits these difficult criteria can be found with producers, wholesalers, and 
processors in the potato and meat industry in the Netherlands. Both industries are well organized 
and are important export industries in the Dutch economy (the Netherlands is the world’s third-
largest exporter of agricultural produce). The industry associations for these staples provided 
accounting data and helped organize the computer-guided interviews with a random sample of 
their members working as (marketing) manager within this industry.  
 
4.1.  Study Design 
 
A personal computer-guided interview was developed, and 20 test interviews were conducted at 
the  manager’s  enterprise  to  ensure  correct  interpretation  of  the  questions.  By  combining 
accounting data with survey data, we are able to relate measures on the attitude and intention 
level  (managerial  focus  on  shareholder  value,  risk  attitudes  and  perceptions)  with  revealed 
market behavior (their contract relationships and use of financial facilitating services. 
 
4.2.  Measures 
 
Manager’s risk attitude was measured by adapting existing scales that were relevant for this 
context to the domain of the managers and  resembles the items from and Pennings and Smidts 
(2000).  The  risk  perception  measure  reflects  managers’  interpretations  of  the  odds  of  being 
exposed to a volatile market environment (cf. Pennings and Wansink, 2004). Managers’ contract 
preferences were measured by asking respondents to indicate whether they would prefer a cash 
contract or forward contract for their main trading partner. The realized contract relationships 
were determined by looking at the past behavior of companies, as registered in their accounting 
data. Whether the manager experienced a conflict with respect to the contract preferences was 
objectively  determined  by  comparing  each  member’s  contract  preference  with  the  actually 
realized  contract  relationship.  Whenever  the  actual  contract  relationship  did  not  match  the 
contract preference as indicated by the manager, it was considered a contract conflict. Managers’ 
use  of  financial  facilitating  services  is  gauged  by  investigating  accounting  data  registering 
whether  or  not  they  used  services  that  complemented  the  pricing  element  of  the  contract 
relationship.  Examples  of  such  services  are  the  hedging  services  provided  by  derivatives 
exchanges  and  banks,  as  well  as  over-the-counter  contracts  offered  by  large  (raw  food) 
companies. Because we focus on the pricing element of contracts, we only included financial  
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facilitating services that deal with pricing. Managers’ focus on shareholder value was measured 
by  direct  responses  on  three  seven-point  items  (1  =  strongly  disagree,  7  =  strongly  agree) 
conceptually consistent with prior work in the financial literature on ownership structure of the 
firm (e.g., Kahn and Winton, 1998).  
 
 
5. Results of Empirical Study 
 
 
Since  the  two  dependent  variables  –  the  firm’s  contract  preference  and  the  use  of  financial 
facilitating  services  –  are  binary,  we  test  our  hypotheses  using  logistic  regression.  For  the 
independent variables measured by scales – such as managers’ risk attitudes and risk perceptions 
– the average sum score was used in the logistic regression. The logistic regression estimates the 
parameters  such  that  the  likelihood  of  the  choice  data  given  the  model  is  maximized.  The 
parameters can be interpreted as the change in the log odds associated with one unit change of 
the independent variable.  
In this case, the odds are defined as the ratio between the probability that a manager prefers a 
forward contract and the probability that he or she prefers a cash contract (H1 and H2), versus the 
ratio  between  the  probability  that  a  manager  uses  a  financial  facilitating  service  and  the 
probability that he or she does not (H3). The logistic regression model produces the likelihood 
ratio statistics and Wald statistics (the square of the parameter estimate divided by the standard 
error), both of which closely follow a χ
2 distribution under the null hypothesis that the parameter 
being tested is zero.  
We  consider  two  goodness-of-fit  statistics  to  examine  the  substantive  significance  of  the 
variables in the model: Nagelkerke’s R
2, which is similar to the R
2 in linear regression (Hair et 
al., 2005), and the proportional reduction of prediction error (PRPE) (cf. Sharma, 1996). The 
latter statistic indicates the improvement in predictive power compared to a null model that does 
not include the predictor variables. The PRPE statistic will get closer to one, the more the model 
improves the null model in terms of predictive power (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). Table 1 
displays the estimation results of the logistic regression. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
5.1.  H1: Managerial focus on shareholder value and contract preferences  
 
Recall that H1 asserts that managers who focus on shareholder value are more likely to use 
forward contracts. As shown in Table 1, a managerial focus on shareholder value significantly 
predicts a manager’s contract preference (p = 0.005), such that a high focus on shareholder value 
leads to a preference for forward contracts. The correctly classified choices of 82.9% (PRPE = 
0.80) and a Nagelkerke’s R
2 of 0.284 show the good fit of the model. This result confirms H1 and 
shows the important role of the manager’s external environment, as reflected by the shareholders, 
on channel contract behavior.  
  The previous results illustrate that shareholders can be thought of as a factor that becomes 
increasingly  important  in  shaping  channel  structure  and  marketing  decisions.  That  is, 
shareholders  do  not  only  influence  the  company  on  abstract  levels  (such  as  providing  the 
company with the financial means to grow by acquisitions), but they also influence concrete  
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marketing activities, such as the way in which a company organizes its channel structure. That is, 
shareholders can influence decisions both on a strategic and tactical level. 
 
5.2.  H2: Risk attitude, risk perception and contract preferences 
 
In  addition  to  the  focus  on  shareholder  value,  it  is  hypothesized  that  the  risk  attitudes  and 
perceptions  of  managers  influence  contract  preferences  (H2).  In  particular,  a  manager’s  risk 
aversion and risk perception are expected to be positively related to his or her preference for a 
forward contract over a cash contract.  
The risk management framework of Pratt (1964) implies that behavior is influenced not only 
by  the  main  effects  of  risk  perception  and  risk  attitude  but  also  by  their  interaction.  This 
interaction causes risk-averse decision-makers to prefer forward contracts over cash contracts, 
and this preference to become more extreme as the manager perceives more risk (Pennings and 
Smidts, 2000).  
Table  1  shows  that  risk  attitude  and  risk  perception  significantly  influence  contract 
preferences in the hypothesized direction (p’s < 0.01). That is, the more managers are both risk-
averse and have high risk perceptions, the more likely they are to prefer a forward contract over a 
cash contract. This interaction between risk attitude and risk perception is significantly related to 
managers’ contract preferences, thereby confirming the work by Pratt, while adding increased 
face validity to our findings. The logistic regression model has a good fit, with 78.2% of the 
choices correctly classified (PRPE = 0.80) and a Nagelkerke’s R
2 of 0.218. These results indicate 
that in order to understand managers’ contracting behavior, we need to consider the main effects 
of risk attitude and risk perception along with their interaction. This interaction between risk 
attitude and risk perception may be thought of as an intention to cope with the risks inherent in 
the channel and the risks that their actions generate.  
We next estimated the simultaneous influence of the external environment (H1) and internal 
environment  (H2)  on  contract  preferences.
9  Consistent with our hypotheses, the full model 
(including risk attitude, risk perception, their interaction, and managerial focus on shareholder 
value)  shows  a  significant  relation  between  how  the  internal  environme nt  and  external 
environment  relate  to  managers’  contract  preferences  (p’s  <  0.01).  Consistent  with  our 
conceptual framework, the full model has a better fit than the models that measure the influence 
of  the  internal  and  external  environment  on  managers’  contract  preferences  separately. 
Furthermore,  we  estimate  the  full  model,  as  well  as  the  separate  models,  for  each  of  the 
wholesalers and processors (unfortunately we had too few producers (n = 15) to estimate the full 
model for this group). The results for these two groups are similar to the results found for the 
entire sample, showing that our results can be generalized across different managers. 
 
5.3.  H3: Incongruent contract preferences and the use of financial facilitating services 
 
Consistent with H3, we find that conflict increases the use of financial facilitating services (p = 
0.004). The data fit the model well, with 87.2% of the choices correctly classified (PRPE = 0.90) 
and a Nagelkerke’s R
2 of 0.305. Whenever a manager’s contract preference did not match the 
actually  realized  contract  relationship  (i.e.,  a  contract  conflict),  he  or  she  was  likely  to  use 
financial  facilitating  services  to  complement  the  cash  flow  generated  by  the  non-preferred 
 
9 The estimation results can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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contract.  Despite  disagreement  about  contract  preferences  and  despite  asymmetric 
interdependence, these results indicate that a successful relationship is still possible with third-
party help (such as a financial institution which provides facilitating services).  
In cases of increasing asymmetry of interdependence trust and commitment decline, while 
inter-firm conflict increases. The use of financial facilitating services can prevent this. Using 
financial facilitating services can re-balance the interdependence structure in the channel, as they 
may mitigate the power advantage of one partner and help increase the performance evaluations 
of exchange partners. Hence, these services can be seen as a conflict resolution tool. 
Interestingly,  the  financial  literature  has  never  looked  at  derivatives  (or  other  financial 
facilitating services) as conflict-solving instruments. Until recently, portfolio theory provided the 
dominant view on the use of financial facilitating services in finance . Only recently has financial 
research begun to view financial facilitating services in a manner that is increasingly consistent 
with the empirical findings reported here (e.g., Froot et al., 1993; Pennings and Leuthold, 2001). 
Such research has argued that if external sources of finance are more costly to corporations than 
internally generated funds, there will typically be a motivation for using financial facilitating 
services. That is, the use of financial facilitating services adds value to the extent that it helps a 
company  ensure  the  sufficient  availability  of  internal  funds  to  take  advantage  of  attractive 
opportunities  and  to  better  manage  relationships  with  other  companies.  The  result  is  a 
convergence of marketing and finance research. Both  areas  are moving towards models that 




6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Our empirical study confirms the hypotheses that managers in the agri-food industry increasingly 
judge marketing strategies based on their potential to enhance shareholder value and to influence 
the magnitude, speed, and volatility of cash flows. The basic philosophy upper management has 
about shareholder value can be translated into contract relationship management to reduce cash 
flow volatility on line-management level. Because of this, channel contract relationships can be a 
valuable market-based asset for companies.  
From the perspective of a line-manager, we show the important role of financial facilitating 
services  as  conflict-solving  instruments.  These  services  can  help  establish  satisfying  channel 
relationships, even if partner companies start from different contract relationship preferences. In 
sum, a firm’s focus on shareholder value and contract relationship management can be used to 
influence the decisions of line-managers in a way that helps to manage cash flow volatility and 
contribute to shareholder value.  
 
6.1.  Managerial Implications 
 
Four  focus  groups  and  a  series  of  individual  interviews  with  industrial  managers  revealed 
consistent concerns about how marketing decisions can enhance shareholder value. Based on the 
developed framework and on our empirical findings, we provide highly actionable suggestions 
for these managers and address the key question: How can a focus on shareholder value be 
translated into marketing decisions?   
10 
 
Shareholder  value  deals  with  cash  flow  levels  and  the  volatility  of  these  cash  flows.  A 
reduction in cash flow volatility means an increase in shareholder value due to a lower cost of 
capital and the released working capital effect. Cash flows are evidenced in the chain of contracts 
that a marketer manages. Cash contracts define the price at the moment of the transaction, based 
on the spot market. The cash flows resulting from such contracts are volatile. Forward contracts, 
on the other hand, specify the price at the moment that the contract is initiated, and the cash 
flows resulting from such contracts are fixed. By choosing the type of contract relationship that 
will best facilitate channel interactions, a marketing manager can have a direct impact on a firms’ 
financial performance.  
Financial facilitating services  can complement the cash  flow component of contracts. For 
example, the cash flow resulting from a cash contract can be transformed to reflect the cash flow 
pattern of a forward contract. This is accomplished by complementing the cash contract with the 
hedging  services  offered  by  derivatives  exchanges.  Financial  facilitating  services  allow 
companies to have successful contract relationships, even with seemingly incompatible contract 
preferences. Therefore, disagreement on contract preferences does not have to result in conflict. 
It can be resolved by financial facilitating services. 
These  financial  facilitating  services  become  even  more  important  when  there  is 
interdependence asymmetry. For instance, if a less dependent company were to use its power to 
obtain  the  preferred  contract  relationship,  it  could  lead  to  a  tense  relationship  with  the  less 
powerful trading partner (Frazier et al., 1989). An alternative would be for the stronger (less 
dependent) company to use financial facilitating services as a means of managing the relationship 
with the less powerful (more dependent) company. By not forcing its preferences upon the other 
party, the powerful company shows a kind of leadership that may decrease conflict and increase 
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Table 1.  Determinants of contract preferences and use of financial facilitating services  
Hypotheses  Parameter     
 estimate 
p-value  Correctly 
classified choices 
PRPE  Nagelkerke R
2 
Hypothesis 1 
         
Dependent variable:  
   Managers’ contract preferences 
    (0 = cash contract, 1 = forward contract) 
         
Independent variable:           
    Managerial focus on shareholder value   1.299  0.005  82.9%  0.8  0.284 
 
Hypothesis 2 
         
Dependent variable:  
  Managers’ contract preferences  
   (0 = cash contract, 1 = forward contract) 
         
Independent variables:           
   Risk attitude   2.894  0.010       
   Risk perception   3.238  0.005       
   Interaction between risk attitude  
      and risk perception 
 0.237  0.006  78.2%  0.8  0.218 
 
Hypothesis 3 
         
Dependent variable:  
   Managers’ use of financial facilitating 
services  
     (0 = not using, 1 = using) 
         
Independent variable           





Figure 1.  Linking channel contracting to shareholder value 
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